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RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
US. Const. amend VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of Benjamin L.1
(decided February 11,1999)
Defendant, Benjamin L. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent
and placed on probation for 1 year by Family Court after being
arrested for acts, which if committed by an adult, would constitute
attempted robbery in the second degree and menacing in the third
degree.2 Defendant appealed claiming that the delay in filing the
presentment agency petition was an infringement on his right to a
speedy trial in violation of both the Federal3 and New York State4
Constitutional right to due process5  The Appellate Division
affirmed the decision of the Family Court and held that the delay
did not "rise to the level of a speedy trial violation." The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division, holding
that juveniles have a right to speedy adjudication and remitted the
matter to Family Court for further proceedings to determine the
reason for the delay.7
I 92 N.Y.2d 660,708 N.E.2d 156, 685 N.Y.S.2d 400 (999).
2 Id at 663,664, 708 N.E.2d at 157, 158,685 N.Y.S2d at 401.
I U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial...." Id
4 N.Y. CONST. art. 1 § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Id
5 Benjaminm 92 N.Y.2d at 664, 708 N.E.2d at 157, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
6 Id. at 664,708 N.E.2d at 158, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 401,402.
7 Id. at 670,708 N.E.2d at 161, 162, 685 N.Y.S2d at 406.
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Defendant Benjamin L. had been arrested for allegedly menacing
a delivery person and attempting to steal the delivery person's
Chinese food, resulting in defendant's detainment in police
custody overnight.8 Family Court held a hearing the following day
wherein it denied the Woodfield Detention Cottage's pre-petition
detention application and returned the defendant to his mother's
custody, as well as ordering the defendant to comply with a 10:00
p.m. curfew.9 The Westchester County Attorney's Office filed a
petition in connection with this incident on August 2, 1995, over
one year after the initial hearing.1° An initial appearance was
scheduled for August 8, 1995 wherein defendant entered a denial
and subsequently moved to dismiss the petition alleging the delay
of over one year in filing the petition violated his statutory right to
a speedy hearing pursuant to the Family Court Act" as well as
violating his right to due process of law."
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by quickly dispensing
with the defendant's initial claim that the delay between the pre-
petition detention application and the fact-finding hearing violated
his right to a speedy trial pursuant to the Family Court Act.13 The
Court noted that amendments to the Family Court Act were ratified
to include more procedural rights for juveniles. 4 Specifically, the
Family Court Act establishes specific time limitations which
govern every stage of the juvenile proceeding, from the arrest
through final disposition, to assure swift adjudication of these
8 Id. at 663,708 N.E.2d at 157, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
9 Id., 708 N.E.2d at 157, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
10 Id.
I Id. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §310.2 (McKinney 1999). The statute provides
in pertinent part: "After a petition has been filed, or upon the signing of an
order of removal pursuant to section 725.05 of the criminal procedure law, the
respondent is entitled to a speedy fact-finding hearing." Id.
12 N.Y. CONST. art. 1 § 6.
13 Benjamin, 92 N.Y.2d at 665, 708 N.E.2d at 158, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 402,403.
'4 Id. (citing Matter of Frank C., 70 N.Y.2d at 413, 516 N.E.2d at 1205-6, 522
N.Y.S.2d at 91, wherein the Court of Appeals discussed the purpose of the
Family Court Act. The court noted that the "speedy hearing" provision for
juveniles was enacted in 1982 as "a part of a sweeping overhaul of the
procedures governing juvenile delinquentcy proceedings.).
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proceedings. 5 Defendant's claim rests on the interpretation of
Family Court Act Section 310.2,16 in that he claims the pre-petition
detention application filed by the Woodfield Detention Cottage on
July 8, 1994 constituted a petition as defined by the statute. 7
Accordingly, the defendant argues, the fact-finding hearing must
have been commenced no later than sixty days after the initial
appearance of July 8, 1995 pursuant to Family Court Act Section
340.1.8 Reasoning that the two petitions are different in
substance, form and purpose, the court rejected defendant's
interpretation, finding that the pre-petition detention application
cannot be equated with a petition pursuant to Family Court Act
Section 310.2.19  Accordingly, the court held that there is no
statutory time limitation for the period between the filing of a pre-
petition detention application and the filing of the petition, when
the juvenile is not at a detention facility. 3
The court then addressed the defendant's due process claims by
noting that although the New York State Constitution does not
contain a speedy trial provision, the court has long held that an
unreasonable delay in prosecuting a defendant following an arrest
can constitute a violation of the State Constitution.2 Historically,
15 Id at 665, 708 N.E.2d at 158, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 402 (citing Bill Jacket, L
1982, ch 920, Mem in support of A 7974-A, as cited in Matter of Frank C., 70
N.Y.2d 408, 413,516 N.E.2d 1203,522 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1987)).
16 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §3102 (McKinney 1999).
17 Benjamin, 92 N.Y.2d at 665,708 N.E.2d at 158, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
18 Id See N.Y. FAi. CT. ACT §340.1(2) (McKinney 1999). The statute
provides in pertinent part: "If the respondent is not in detention the fact-finding
hearing shall commence not more than sixty days after the conclusion of the
initial appearance except as provided in subdivision four." Id.
19 Benjamin, 92 N.Y.2d at 665, 708 N.E.2d at 158, 159, 685 N.Y.S2d at 403
(reasoning that a pre-petition detention application is filed by the detention
facility whereas a petition is filed by the presentment agency. The purpose of
the pre-petition detention application is to determine if the minor should be
detained prior to the filing of a petition. The petition itself is a written
accusation by the presentment agency which formally commences the juvenile
proceedings).
20 Id at 667-68, 708 N.E.2d at 159, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 403 (noting the statute
does not provide a remedy for this type of delay).
21 Id. at 667, 708 N.E.2d at 159, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 403 (citing People v. Staley,
41 N.Y.2d 789,791,364 N.E.2d 1111,396 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1977)). In Staley, the
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juveniles had not been afforded the same constitutional protections
as adult criminal defendants because juvenile proceedings had
been viewed as rehabilitative and informal in nature, whereas the
adult criminal proceedings were viewed as adversarial and
punitive.' It was.not until 1967 in the landmark decision of In Re
Gault that the Supreme Court altered the parameters of juvenile
proceedings to afford certain fundamental procedural rights to
juveniles.'
The case of IORe 'Gault involved a juvenile who had been
committed as a juvenile delinquent to the Arizona State Industrial
Schools after being taken into police custody without notice being
given to his parents.24 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction
due to the failure of the Juvenile Court to issue written notice of
the specific charge or allegations,' notify the juvenile of his right
to counsel,2 6 and its failure to adhere to the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination.27 Aware of the differences between the
juvenile system and the adult criminal proceeding, the Court,
although affording certain due process rights to juveniles, did not
find them entitled to all the rights of their adult counterparts.28 The
defendant was arrested for criminal possession of stolen property and reckless
endangerment. Id. at 790. The prosecutor subsequently dismissed the charges
without prejudice to presentation to the Grand Jury. Id. Thirty-one months
later, an indictment was returned, without any reason for the delay. Id. at 791.
The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and
dismissed the indicment stating "[t]he guarantee of prompt prosecution is
derived in part from the constitutional right to a speedy trial, but in more
encompassing terms, from the constitutional mandate of Due Process of law."
Id. at 790.
12 Benjamin at 664, 708 N.E.2d at 158, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 402 (discussing the
differences between the juvenile and adult criminal proceedings).
23 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
24 Id. at5.
2 Id. at33.
26 Id. at 16.
27 d.
21 In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16. The court discussed the history of the juvenile
system and the philosophy that society was there to help the child who was
essentially good, the child was not to feel under arrest or on trial and therefore
the rules of criminal procedure were not applicable. Id. at 15. The court
applied its prior holding in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), stating
that the juvenile court adjudication of "delinquency" although not required to
722 [Vol 16
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Court held that "the observance of due process standards,
intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the
States to abandon, or displace any of the substantive benefits of the
juvenile proceedings."29
The right to a speedy trial is quite different from other
constitutional rights, in that the guarantee cannot be quantified into
a precise number of days or months, but rather must be subjected
to the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Barker v.
Wingo3 In Barker v. Wingo, although the defendant was arrested
for murder but was not brought to trial until over five years later,"
the Supreme Court found no violation of the defendant's right to a
speedy trial.' In analyzing the detrimental effects on both the
defendant and society by not affording the accused with a speedy
trial, the Court rejected two possible approaches to eliminate some
of the uncertainty inherent in the guarantee itself.33 The first
suggested approach was to enunciate a specific time period in
which a criminal defendant must be tried.' The second proffered
alternative is known as the "demand rule," in which the right to
speedy trial would be available to only those defendants who have
conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial, must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30. The
decision was limited to the right to written notice of the specific charges in
advance of a hearing; notification of the right to counsel; the privilege against
self-incrimination; and the right to a hearing based on sworn testimony, with the
corresponding right to cross-examination. Id at 10.
29 Id at21.
1 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
31 Id. at 516, 517. The delay was due to the Commonwealth's belief that it
had a stronger case against another suspect, Silas Manning. The
Commonwealth had hoped to secure a conviction against Manning and in turn
have him testify against Willie Barker without fear of self-incrimination. The
Commonwealth, however, was not successful in obtaining a conviction against
Manning until December 1962. Id. at 516-17.
' Id. at 536. The Court made note that Barker was not represented by
competent counsel which would explain why he failed to object to the
Commonwealth's requests for continuances. Rather, the record indicated that
Barker did not want a speedy trial. Id. at 536.
33 Id. at 522-23.
1 Id The Court rejected the specific time period approach, reasoning that this
is a state legislative function and not within their judicial powers. Id. at 523.
2000
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demanded the same.3" The Court then set forth a balancing test in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed.36 Though the Supreme Court did not find a constitutional
violation in Barker, it laid the foundation on which federal courts
sAould determine ture alleged violations of the right to a speedy
trial.37 All such claims were to be determined by the balancing of
the following factors: length of the delay, the reason for the delay,
the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant.38
Twenty years following the decision, the Supreme Court was
called upon to clarify further the Barker analysis in Doggett v.
United States.39 The Doggett case involved a defendant who had
been indicted for conspiring to import and distribute cocaine in
February 1980, but who was not actually arrested until September
1988.' The Federal Magistrate assigned to the case applied the
Barker factors and recommended that the district court deny the
defendant's motion for dismissal based on an alleged violation of
his right to a speedy trial." The Magistrate's recommendation was
35 Id. at 524. The Court rejected the "demand rule" approach, reasoning that
the burden of protecting the Constitutional right to a speedy trial must not rest
solely on defendants. Id at 524. The Court did hold that some of the
responsibility shall rest with defendants, in that their objection to any delay is a
factor to be considered. Id. at 528.
36 Id. at 530 (noting that cases involving the right to a speedy trial must be
approached on an ad hoc basis).
37 Id.
38 Id. The Court concluded that although the length of the delay of five years
was extraordinary, the other factors outweighed it. Id. at 533-34. Prejudice
suffered by the defendant was minimal; there was no claim hat the defendant's
witnesses had died or otherwise became unavailable. Id. at 534. Lastly, the
Court held that the defendant did not want a speedy trial, and that the record
strongly suggested that the defendant hoped to take advantage of the delay. Id.
at 535.
3' Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
4 Id. at 648-49. The Drug Enforcement Agency was unable to apprehend the
defendant because he was initially under arrest in Panama but was subsequently
able to enter the United States unnoticed due to computer error. The defendant
returned to the United States in 1982 and was not searched for by the authorities
until September 1988. Id. at 649.
41 Id. at 650 (finding that although 1) the delay was long enough to be
"presumptively prejudicial;" 2) the delay was caused by the negligence of the
724 [Vol 16
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based on the contention that the defendant was required to make an
affirmative showing of "actual prejudice."'4 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that a showing of particularized prejudice is not
essential in every speedy trial action.43 The Court noted that
excessive delays presumptively call into question the reliability of
trials in ways that are very difficult to prove or identify.M In
concluding that actual prejudice need not be shown in every case,
the Court acknowledged that presumptive prejudice is just one of
the criteria set forth in Barker and the weight afforded to it will
increase with the length of the delay.45
The New York State courts, relying on Barker v. Wingo, have
enumerated additional factors to be weighed when determining if a
speedy trial violation exists. 6 In the case of People v.
Taranovich' the New York Court of Appeals announced the
factors that should be considered: the extent of the delay; the
reason for the delay; the nature of the underlying charge; whether
or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration;
and whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been
impaired by reason of the delay.' Considering these factors, the
court held that the defendant in Taranovich, who was indicted one
Government; and 3) that the defendant could not be faulted for not asserting his
right earlier, the defendant had failed to make a showing of prejudice).
42 Id. at 650-51 (holding the defendant had made no affirmative showing that
the delay had impaired his defense or otherwise prejudiced him). The Court of
Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, affirmed, ruling that the only way to prevail on a
speedy trial claim was by a showing of actual prejudice or by establishing that
the first of the three Barker factors weighed heavily in the defendant's favor. Id.
at 651.
43 Id. at 655.
' Id. "Barker explicitly recognized that impairment of one's own defense is
the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time's erosion
of exculpatory evidence and testimony can rarely be shown." Id. at 655.
45 Id. at 655-56.
46 See People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 335 N.E.2d 303, 373 N.Y.S.2d
79 (1975).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 445,335 N.E.2d at 306,373 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82.
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year after being arrested,49 was not deprived of his right to a speedy
trial.50
The Taranovich court, like its federal counterpart, addressed the
length of the delay as the primary factor, due to the probability that
the defendant is more likely to be harmed by the delay than the
state.5' Finding that the delay did not hamper the defendant in the
defense of the charges, the court held the reason for the delay was
the defendant's strongest assertion.5' The reason the defendant
was not iaicted-until at least five years after being arrested was
due to clerical error by the district attorney's office.53 Remarkably,
the court held this clerical error which resulted in a five-year delay
was not sufficient in itself to dismiss the indictment.54 In contrast,
the nature of the underlying charge weighed very heavily against
the defendant in light of the seriousness of the allegations against
him.55  Similarly, since there was a minimal length of
incarceration, it was unlikely the defense was hampered to an
extent warranting dismissal of the charges.56 The final factor
considered by the Taranovich court was whether the defendant was
49 Id. at 444, 335 N.E.2d at 304,373 N.Y.S.2d at 80-81.
' Taranovich at 444, 335 N.E.2d at 304, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 80. Defendant had
been arraigned on January 14, 1972 for attempted murder, possession of a
dangerous drug in the sixth degree, resisting arrest, leaving the scene of an
accident, operating a motor vehicle while impaired and operating a motor
vehicle without a license. Id. Defendant had been released on bail eight days
later, and was held for an action of the Grand Jury which charged him with
assault in the first degree and leaving the scene of an accident on February 10,
1972. Id. However defendant was not indicted until January 13, 1973. Id., 335
N.E.2d at 304,373 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
5' Id. at 445, 335 N.E.2d at 3b6, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 82; see also Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530.
52 Id. at 446,335 N.E.2d at 306, 307,373 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
51 Id., 335 N.E.2d at 306,307, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
54 Id., 335 N.E.2d at 306, 307, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 82 (discussing that although
such a clerical error is inexcusable, the only remedy for a speedy trial violation
is dismissal of charges, and such an error in this case did not warrant such a
drastic remedy).
" Id., 335 N.E.2d at 306, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 82. Defendant was arrested for
attempted murder and indicted for assault in the first degree. Id.
56 Id. (reasoning that defendant's eight day incarceration did not warrant
dismissal as defendant was not incarcerated long enough to be at a disadvantage
conceming the preparation of his defense).
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impaired by the delay.' The court reasoned that this was the most
critical factor because any period of delay may be unreasonable
and is determined by whether the likelihood of the defendant's
acquittal has been affected.58 Since the Taranovich case involved
the testimony of only two witnesses, i.e., the defendant and the
victim, there was little chance that either would have forgotten the
facts and circumstances of the incident. 9 Therefore, there was
negligible prejudice to the defendant.6
In Benjamin, the Court of Appeals extended the constitutional
right to a speedy trial, as enunciated in Taranovich, to juveniles in
delinquency proceedings. 61 However, the court strongly warned
against blindly applying the analysis used in criminal cases to
juvenile proceedings in light of the unique nature of the latter.'
Specifically, the court noted factors such as extended period of
pretrial incarceration, although extremely relevant in criminal
cases, are not as important in juvenile proceedings due to the strict
time limitations imposed by the Family Court Act.' Additionally,
prejudice due to length of delay may be much easier to prove in
57 Taranovich. at 446-47, 335 N.E.2d at 306, 373 N.Y.Sl.d at 83 (noting that
issue of whether or not the defendant has been impaired by the delay is the most
critical in this case).
51 Id at 447, 335 N.E.2d at 307, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 83 (recognizing that in
certain circumstances the delay may be so great that there is no need for proof
nor fact of prejudice to the defendant).
59 Id
60 Id. (acknowledging that delay may result in defendant's being unable to call
certain witnesses or the memories of witnesses are likely to fade thereby
impairing the defense).
61 Benjamin, 92 N.Y.2d at 667-68, 708 N.E.2d at 160, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 404
(citing United States v. Furey, 500 F.2d 338 (2nd Cir. 1974). "The deterence
afforded by prompt disposition, the potential prejudice to a defense and the
personal disruption created by a criminal charge are present whether the accused
is ajuvenile or an adult.").
6 Id., 708 N.E.2d at 160, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 404, 405 (stressing that courts must
remain acutely aware of the goals, character and unique nature of the juvenile
proceeding when applying the Taranovich test); see supra notes 46-60 and
accompanying text.
6 Id. at. 669, 708 N.E.2d at 160, 161, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 404, 405; see also
N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr §340.1(2) (McKinney 1999).
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juvenile proceedings than in a criminal case." The court cautioned
that the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile proceeding warrants
a speedy trial.'5 In addition, a child who is subjected to a long
delay, which results in a dismissal on due process grounds, will not
benefit from the rehabilitative. systent. Summarily, the court held
that there is no per se rule regarding speedy trial violations in
juvenile proceedings.67 Rather the factors must be considered as a
whole in light of the facts of each case. 6' In so holding, the court
reversed the decision of the Appellate Division and remanded the
case to Family Court to determine the reason for the delay, and to
evaluate the due process claim in light of the all the factors
enumerated herein.69
In sum, New York case law in connection with speedy trial
violations can be distinguished from its federal counterpart. New
York case law has applied the additional factor of the nature of the
underlying charge in its analysis, while not considering the extent
of the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial.7' That
notwithstanding, it seems clear that both New York and federal
case law are in agreement that prompt disposition of criminal
6 Benjamin, 92 N.Y.2d at 669, 708 N.E.2d at 161, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 405. The
court noted that the likelihood of prejudice suffered by a juvenile may be greater
due to the young age and inexperience of the child. Id The sheer length of the
delay is important in criminal proceedings because "all other factors being
equal, the greater the delay the more probable it is that the accused will be
harmed thereby." Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d at 445, 335 N.E.2d at 306, 373
N.Y.S.2d at 82. The court held that this is more apparent in juvenile
proceedings because it is more likely that a child will forget the specifics of an
incident, the identity of specific witnesses and other various details. Benjamin,
92 N.Y.2d at 669, 708 N.E.2d at 161,685 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
61 Id. at 670, 708 N.E.2d at 161, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
6 Id. The court stated: "a child in need of rehabilitative efforts should not be
denied that ameliorative attention merely because of some delay." Id.
67 Id
6 id
69 Id., 708 N.E.2d at 161, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 406; see also People v. Singer, 44
N.Y.2d 241, 255, 376 N.E.2d 179, 187 405 N.Y.S.2d 17. "Although the people
have the burden of establishing good cause for the delay, their failure to do so on
this record should not be conclusive." Id.
70 Benjamin, 92 N.Y.2d at 668, 708 N.E.2d at 160, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 404; see
also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530.
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charges is a right that is to be protected regardless of whether the
accused is an adult or a juvenile' The New York Court of
Appeals has recognized the importance of establishing such a
procedural precedentO Although the juvenile in Benjamin is now
close to twenty years old, the court has remitted the matter for a
hearing to decide the reason for the delay in filing the presentment
agency petition.' The Family Court is to determine the reason for
the delay and apply the enumerated factors of Taranovich in order
to decide the case correctly and to set the proper standard, which is
to be applied by the courts of New York to all future speedy trial
claims.! 4
Stephanie Beige
71 See United States v. Furey, 500 F.2d. 338,342 (2nd Cir.1974).
72 Benjamin, 92 N.Y.2d at 671,708 N.E.2d at 162, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
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